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Prior evaluations are frequently challenged and need to be
revised. We propose that an important determinant of such revi-
sions is the degree to which the challenge provides an opportu-
nity to compare the target against a competitor. Whenever a
challenge offers an opportunity, the information contained in
the challene will carry a disproportionate weight in the revised
judgments. We call this proposition the comparison–revision
hypothesis. In Experiments 1–3, we manipulated comparison
opportunity by varying the format of the challenge and examined
the weights assigned to different inputs in the revised judgments.
The results indicate that prior information about the target
receives a greater weight under a noncomparative challenge
(which provides information only about the target) than under
a comparative challenge (which compares the target with a com-
petitor). In contrast, information presented in the challenge
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receives a greater weight under a comparative challenge than
under a noncomparative challenge. Interestingly, when pre-
sented in a comparative format, the information contained in
the challenge received a relatively disproportionate weight even
when the attributes presented in the challenge were less
important than those on which the prior target evaluations were
based. Results from Experiment 4 suggest that, under certain
conditions, even a noncomparative challenge from a superior
competitor can provide strong comparison opportunity and thus
cause greater revisions in the prior evaluations of the target.
Specifically,agreaterelaborationoftheinitialtargetinformation
and a high degree of commensurability between the target and
competitor information jointly promote comparison opportunity
and thus cause greater revisions of the prior target judgments.
Our findings offer important extensions to previous research on
the effects of amount and elaboration of prior target information
on subsequent judgment revision. q 1999 Academic Press
Decision making often calls for the repeated evaluation of targets. Because
the information available across judgment episodes may have different evalua-
tive implications, prior evaluations often need to be revised. For instance, an
employer who had a positive impression upon reading a job applicant’s resume
may have a different opinion after interviewing this applicant. Similarly, a
consumer who initially liked a new product after seeing its promotional mate-
rial may revisit this opinion upon an unfavorable review from Consumer Re-
ports. This article investigates how revision of a prior evaluation depends on
the nature of challenging information.
The amount of judgment revision that a challenge causes clearly depends on
the scale value of the challenging information relative to the initial evaluation
(Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992; Johar, Jedidi, & Jacoby, 1997). Prior research sug-
gests that the amount of judgment revision is also a function of characteristics
of the information underlying the prior evaluation. In particular, evaluative
judgments that are initially based on a large amount of information and,
independent of the amount, on information that has been well elaborated
should be less amenable (i.e., more resistant) to subsequent revision (Anderson,
1981; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992; Petty, Haugtvedt, &
Smith, 1995; Wood, 1982).
This article examines an additional determinant of judgment revision:
whether the challenging information provides an opportunity for comparing
the target with a competitor on one or more attributes. We propose that, every-
thing else being equal, challenges that facilitate comparisons of the target
against its competitors induce a greater judgment revision in the direction
implied by these comparisons. The opportunity for comparison triggered by
certain challenges may mitigate—and sometimes reverse—the previously doc-
umented negative relationship between the amount and elaboration of prior
informationandthe degreeofsubsequentrevision.We investigatetheinterplay230 MUTHUKRISHNAN, PHAM, AND MUNGALE ￿
betweencomparisonopportunityandpriorinformationacrossfourexperiments
covering both consumer judgments and personnel-selection judgments.
PRIOR INFORMATION AND JUDGMENT INERTIA
Previous investigations have linked judgment revision to the information
upon which the initial evaluation has been formed. Research drawing on infor-
mation integration theory stresses that in sequential judgments, the weight
attached to a prior judgment—as opposed to new information—is a positive
functionoftheamountofinformationunderlyingthepriorjudgment(Anderson,
1981; Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992). As a result, judgments that are based on a
large amount of information tend to undergo lesser subsequent revision.
Similarly, some research in the attitude literature suggests that initial atti-
tudes that are based on a large amount of relevant, proattitudinal information
tend to be more resistant to counterattitudinal messages (Haugtvedt, Schu-
mann,Schneier,&Warren,1994;Wood,1982).Specifically,ifapersonpossesses
a large amount of attitude-relevant information in memory at the time of
encountering a challenge, he or she has a greater arsenal of arguments to draw
upon to defend his or her prior attitudes (Haugtvedt et al., 1994; Wood, 1982).
Other research suggests that, even when the amount of initial information is
held constant, conditions that enhance sheer elaboration of the initial informa-
tion also increase attitudinal resistance (Haugtvedt & Wegener, 1994; Petty &
Cacioppo, 1986; Petty et al., 1995). Attitudes that are based on well-elaborated
information tend to be more internally consistent and thus held with greater
confidence (Eagly & Chaiken, 1995; Petty et al., 1995).
Although both amount and elaboration of prior information should generally
decrease subsequent revision, we propose that judgment revision will also be
determined by whether the challenge facilitates comparisons between the tar-
get and its competitors. As explained below, under strong opportunity for com-
parisons, the negative relationship between amount and elaboration of prior
information and judgment revision observed in prior research may be attenu-
ated or even reversed.
THE ROLE OF COMPARISON OPPORTUNITY IN JUDGMENT REVISION
Comparison Opportunity
Challenges of equal negativity (i.e., scale value) may vary in the degree to
whichtheyfacilitatecomparisonsbetweenthetargetandpotentialcompetitors.
Some challenges allow for easy comparisons between the target and potential
competitorsalongjudgment-relevantdimensions;otherchallengesdonot.Prior
research that investigated the effects of the amount of attitude relevant infor-
mation available (Haugtvedt et al., 1994; Wood, 1982) and elaboration
(Haugtvedt & Wegener, 1994) considered only one type of challenge—
counterattitudinal information about the target with no reference to any com-
petitor. Such challenges, by their very nature, offer very little opportunity toCOMPARISON AND JUDGMENT REVISION 231
compare the target with any other object. Challenges provide strong opportu-
nity for competitive comparisons whenever two conditions are met: (1) the
judge has joint access to both target and competitor information on judgment-
relevant dimensions and (2) the two sets of information are commensurable.
The first condition—joint access to target and competitor information—can
be met in several ways. First, the challenge may explicitly provide information
about both the target and its competitors. That is, both target and competitor
information would be externally available for judgment updating. This is the
case, for instance, in comparative advertisements and in many equity-analysis
reports. Second, the challenge may only provide information only about the
competitor, but the judge can pit this information against information about
the target that is highly available in memory. The competitor information
would be externally available during judgment updating, whereas the target
information would be internally available. For instance, consumers may com-
pare newly revealed information about a superior competitor brand with their
recollection of the target brand’s attributes.
The second condition—commensurability of the target and competitor infor-
mation—refers to the degree to which side-by-side examination of the target
and competitor information allows the detection of superiority relations among
thealternativesintermsofoneormoreattributes.Commensurabilitytherefore
depends on whether the alternatives are described along common as opposed
to unique attributes (Slovic & MacPhillamy, 1974). It also depends on the
format of the supplied information. Certain information formats may hinder
comparisons even though the alternatives are described along common dimen-
sions. For instance, an advertisement for Car X that may emphasize the benefit
of high gas mileage by specifying the number of miles per gallon (mpg) that
the car offers, whereas another advertisement for Car Y may promote the same
benefit without providing a specific mpg value (“Excellent MPG”). Although
both cars are described along a common dimension, commensurability would
be low because side-by-side comparison of the two claims would not unambigu-
ously reveal the superiority of one car over the other.
Therefore, commensurability is the sole determinant of comparison opportu-
nity in stimulus-based decisions, where information about all alternatives is
readily available at the time of judgment. However, in most judgment revision
situations, memory plays a significant role because the judge needs to recall
information that was learned previously (Alba, Hutchinson, & Lynch, 1991;
Weber, Goldstein, & Barlas, 1995). In such situations, along with commensura-
bility of the target and competitor attributes, an accurate recall of the values
of the target’s attributes is necessary for a competitor challenge to promote
comparison.
The Comparison–Revision Hypothesis
We propose that the challenges that foster comparisons between a target
and potential competitors increase people’s tendency to revise their judgments
of the target. Whenever such comparisons are made—whether explicitly or232 MUTHUKRISHNAN, PHAM, AND MUNGALE ￿
implicitly—their evaluative implications (e.g., “Candidate A’s interview was
much poorer than Candidate B’s”) will carry a disproportionate weight in the
revised judgment of the target. We call this principle the comparison–
revision hypothesis.
Various streams of research are consistent with the hypothesis that informa-
tionthatinvitescompetitivecomparisonswillreceiveadisproportionateweight
injudgment revisions.First, researchon comparativeadvertisingsuggests that
comparative messages receive greater attention than their noncomparative
counterparts (Pechmann & Stewart, 1990). Information that invites compari-
sons may thus be more salient. Second, some attribute values (e.g., “Dictionary
A has 10,000 entries”) may be hard to evaluate without a reference point. An
opportunity to compare across alternatives (e.g., “Dictionary B has 20,000
entries”) increases these attributes’ “evaluability” and therefore their weight
in judgments and choices (Hsee, 1996; Slovic & MacPhillamy, 1974). In general,
competitive information increases the diagnosticity of attributes by hinting to
the range of possible values of these attributes or by providing a “local context”
(e.g., Goldstein, 1990; Mellers & Cooke, 1996; Pham, 1996). Third, competitive
comparisons offer compelling reference points that may deviate significantly
from the reference points people originally used in their initial evaluations.
The change of reference points can be a potent trigger of judgment revisions
(Hsee & Leclerc, 1998; Tversky & Shaffir, 1992). Finally, recent research sug-
gests that in judgment and choice, people have a natural tendency to assess
the mapping of features across alternatives. Information that is conducive
of this mapping (called structural alignment) should receive greater weight
(Markman & Medin, 1995).
Predictions and Research Agenda
In summary, we argue that the extent of judgment revision that follows a
challenge depends not only on the characteristics of prior evaluation such as
amount and elaboration of the prior information, but also on whether the
challenge promotes an opportunity for comparison between the target and its
potential competitors. A strong opportunity for comparison exists whenever
both competitor and target information isaccessible at the time of the challenge
and this information is commensurable. Whenever comparisons between the
target and its competitors are encouraged, these comparisons will carry a
disproportionate weight in the revised judgments.
We tested the comparison–revision hypothesis in four experiments. The first
experiment shows that challenges that explicitly invite a comparison between
the target and a competitor decrease people’s reliance on prior target informa-
tion in their revised judgments. This finding qualifies the previously docu-
mented negative relationship between the amount of prior information and
the extent of revision. We attempted a conservative test of this prediction by
using a challenge that provides information on less important dimensions
than those that were used in the initial description of the target. The second
experiment shows that challenges that explicitly invite comparisons betweenCOMPARISON AND JUDGMENT REVISION 233
the target and a competitor are indeed weighted more heavily in judgment
revision than challenges that do not invite such comparisons. The third experi-
ment suggests that the findings of Experiment 1, which focus on consumer
decisionmaking,generalizetoanemployeeselectiondecision.Thefourthexper-
iment shows that challenges that implicitly invite comparisons by supplying
superior competitor information may also prompt significant revision provided
that (1) the competitor information is commensurable with the target informa-
tion that was previously learned and (2) people have adequate memory for
the prior target information. This experiment also shows that the previously
documented negative relationship between elaboration of prior information
and subsequent judgment revision (e.g., Haugtvedt & Wegener, 1994) can be
reversed under conditions that enhance opportunity for comparison.
EXPERIMENT 1
Prior research has shown that initial learning of a high amount of attitude-
relevant and consistent target information and availability of such information
at the time of revision decrease subsequent judgment revision upon challenge
(Haugtvedt et al., 1994; Wood, 1982). This experiment tests the prediction that
this relationship is moderated by opportunity for comparison. The format of
challenge—a comparative format in which the target is compared to a competi-
tor on a set of attributes or a noncomparative format in which counterattitudi-
nal information is provided about the target but no competitor is mentioned—
served as the manipulation of opportunity for comparison. As explained earlier,
comparative challenges will increase the weight of the information contained
in the challenges and decrease the weight of the prior target information even
whenthechallengeconsistsoflessimportantclaimsthanthosethatconstituted
the prior target information. A corollary prediction is that judgment revision
willdependonmemoryforthepriortargetinformationunderanoncomparative
challenge(providing littleopportunity forcomparison),but notunder acompar-
ative challenge (providing high opportunity for comparison).
Method
Overview. The stimuli were reconstructed on the basis of information con-
tained in two published articles (Haugtvedt et al., 1994, and Schumann,
Petty, & Clemons, 1990). While the target brand name and several product
claims were adopted from these articles, we constructed the print ads and the
embedding materials after a series of pretests. We also adopted the general
procedure followed by Haugtvedt et al. (1994). Participants in this experiment
formed initial evaluations of a target brand based on either a high or low
amount of positive information, i.e., product claims. A pretest had determined
thattheselectedclaimswerehomogenousintermsofimportance(seeAppendix
A). Participants were subsequently exposed to information that challenged the
target. To manipulate the opportunity for comparison, two types of challenge
wereused. Inthe noncomparativecondition, thechallenge consistedof negative234 MUTHUKRISHNAN, PHAM, AND MUNGALE ￿
information about the target that did not make any comparative reference to
a competitor. In the comparative condition, the challenge consisted of the same
negative information about the target phrased in a comparative format. As
explained below, another pretest ensured that the two types of challenge were
equally negative (i.e., had equivalent scale values).
Participants, design, and procedure. Participants in this study, as well as
intheotherstudies,wereundergraduatebusinessstudentswhoreceivedcourse
credits in exchange for their participation. A total of 102 participants were
randomly assigned to one of four conditions of a 2 (amount of information) 3
2 (type of challenge) between-subjects design. Data from four participants who
did not return for the second session were excluded. The experiment was
administered in two sessions separated by 2 days. The amount of information
was manipulated in the first session, and the comparison climate was manipu-
lated in the second session.
Participants were told that they would be evaluating a TV cartoon program.
Becausetheprojectwasstillinitsearlystages,thepilottestwouldbeconducted
with a print version of the program’s storyboard presented in a booklet. Partici-
pants were also told that in order to simulate the experience of watching TV,
there would be ads scattered at intervals through the booklet. Each booklet
consisted of a series of panels taken from a comic book among which three
pods of advertisements were inserted. Each pod contained two advertisements,
one for the target product (a pen called Omega) and one for a filler product
(a supermarket brand). After reading the booklet, participants completed a
questionnaire assessing initial evaluations of the target brand and the filler
brand. Thequestionnaire alsomeasured participants’confidence intheir evalu-
ation.
When participants returned after 2 days, they read a Consumer Reports-
type document (the challenge) which conveyed negative information about the
target brand and neutral information about the filler brand. After reading this
document, participants were administered another questionnaire which again
measured their (postchallenge) evaluations of the target and filler brands and
the perceived negativity of the information contained in the challenge. After
obtaining the postchallenge evaluations of the target, we assessed subjects’
memory for the target brand information presented during the first session.
Amount of information. In the high-information condition, participants
were exposed to a total of nine claims (see Appendix A) distributed across three
executions of the target ad. In the low-information condition, participants were
exposed to only three claims (a subset of the nine claims provided in the high-
information condition) which appeared in the third execution (the first two
executions contained the brand name and the spokesperson). These initial
claims in both conditions were in a noncomparative format.
Type of challenge. Participants in the noncomparative challenge condition
received information that portrayed the target brand in a negative light. The
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shipped were difficult to open if the instructions were not carefully followed.”
In the comparative challenge condition, the same information was presented
by comparing the target brand with a competitor brand called Elegance. For
instance, the report stated that “Compared to those of the Elegance, the pack-
ages in which the Omega 3 pens were shipped were more difficult to open if
the instructions were not carefully followed.”
It is important to note that the noncomparative and comparative challenges
were calibrated in such a way that the challenges would portray the target
brand in an equally negative light. In a pretest (n 5 28), two groups of partici-
pants received either the comparative or the noncomparative version of the
challenging information. They then evaluated the target pen on a scale of 1
(bad)t o9( good) only on the basis of information contained in the challenge.
There was no difference between the ratings of the two groups (Mnoncomparative
5 2.81 and Mcomparative 5 2.67, F , 1). This assumption was also validated by
a confounding check discussed below 1. Further, in order to have a conservative
test of the effects of comparison climate, based on another pretest (n 5 63),
we selected challenging claims that were perceived to be less important than
those contained in the initial information (see Appendix A for the claims and
their importance ratings).2
Dependent variables. In both sessions, evaluative judgment of the target
brand was measured on two 9-scales anchored by negative–positive and unfa-
vorable–favorable (r 5 .84). Confidence in evaluation was measured on a 9-
point scale anchored by not at all confident and extremely confident. Perceived
negativity of the challenge was also measured on a 9-point scale (not at all
negative to extremely negative). In order to examine the underlying processes,
memory for the target brand information (presented during the first session)
was measured through free recall. Each recall item was coded as accurate/
inaccurate by two judges who were blind to the objectives of the experiment
and to the experimental manipulations (agreement 5 90%; disagreements
resolved by one of the authors).
Plan of Analysis
In the present experiment as well as in the subsequent experiments, the
main dependent variables were (1) the proportion of participants who revised
their judgments, i.e., the probability of revision, and (2) the amount of change
from the prior evaluations (prior evaluation to postchallenge evaluation). In
each experiment, we submitted the former to a binary logit analysis and the
1 It remains possible that these pretests may have lacked the power to uncover a significant
difference in negativity between the two challenge formats. Note, however, that the confounding
check in Experiment 1 had a power of approximately 0.90 to detect a “medium effect” of F 5 0.25
(Cohen, 1988) at a 5 0.05. The observed F was approximately 0.057, and this suggests that there
was very little difference between the two formats of challenge in terms of perceived negativity.
2 The means of perceived importance of claims used in the initial (high amount of) information
and the challenge were 8.83 and 7.76 respectively [F(1, 61) 5 21.04, p , .01]. Thus, the challenge
claims were clearly less important than those used in the initial information.236 MUTHUKRISHNAN, PHAM, AND MUNGALE ￿
latter to a between-subjects ANOVA. In some experiments, the proportion of
participantswhorevisedtheirjudgmentswas100%inatleastoneexperimental
cell. In such cases, we use, as an alternative dependent variable, the proportion
of participants who revised their judgments by at least 1 scale unit.
Results
Manipulation and confounding checks. Another pretest (n 5 30) ensured
that the low and high information groups were equal in terms of judgment
persistence when they encountered no challenge (amount of change: Mlow 5
.15 and Mhigh 5 .19; F , 1). The two groups also did not differ in terms of
proportion of participants who revised their judgments (x2(1) ,1). Participants
in the main experiment were asked to rate the perceived negativity of the
challenges. Consistent with pretest results, the comparative and noncompara-
tive challenges did not differ in terms of perceived negativity (Mnoncomparative 5
3.68 and Mcomparative 5 3.54; F , 1). Thus, the two types of challenge had equal
scalevaluesintermsoftheirevaluativeimplicationsforthetarget.Thenumber
of attributes recalled at Time 2 provides a check for the amount of information
manipulation. An ANOVA testing the effects of amount of information, type of
attack, and their interaction revealed only a main effect of amount of informa-
tion, F(1, 94) 5 18.67, p , . 001. As expected, participants in the high-informa-
tion condition recalled more attributes (M 5 1.21) than those in the low-
information condition (M 5 0.48).
Confidence at Time 1. Confidence in the initial judgment was greater in
thehigh-informationcondition(M55.25)thaninthelow-informationcondition
(M 5 4.62; F(1, 96) 5 3.88, p , .05). The initial evaluations thus appear to
have greater strength in terms of confidence in the high-information condition
thaninthelow-informationcondition.However,asreportedbelow,theapparent
strength of these initial evaluations did not necessarily predict the degree of
revision across conditions.
Likelihood of revision. Table 1 presents the proportion of participants who
TABLE 1
Experimental 1 (Pen): Effects of Amount of Target Information and
Format of Challenge
Noncomparative Comparative
challenge challenge Pretest
Dependent measure Low info High info Low info High info Low info High info
Initial judgment 5.24 5.54 5.04 5.73 5.30 5.15
Confidence at Time 1 4.39 5.13 4.81 5.38 ** **
Postchallenge judgment 3.33 4.69 3.76 3.94 5.15 4.96
Judgment revision 1.91 0.85 1.28 1.79 0.15 0.19
Proportion of judgment revision 87% 58% 70% 83% 27% 20%
by more than 0 units (20/23) (14/24) (19/27) (20/24) (4/15) (3/15)
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revised their judgments for each experimental condition. These categorical
datawere submittedto atwo-factor (amountof information3typeof challenge)
binary logit analysis. The interaction between amount of information and com-
parisonclimatewassignificant(Waldx2(1)55.15,p,.03).Afollow-upanalysis
by challenge type revealed that the amount of initial information significantly
reduced the probability of revision under noncomparative challenge (Wald
x2(1) 5 4.39, p , .04) but not under comparative challenge (Wald x2(1) 5 1.16,
p . .28). Under comparative challenge, the probability of revision was high
regardless of the amount of prior information.
Judgment revision. The difference between pre- and postchallenge judg-
ments of the target brand (judgment revision) served as the key dependent
variable. Judgment revisions were submitted to a two-way (amount of informa-
tion 3 type of challenge) between-subjects ANOVA (see Table 1 for evaluation
and confidence means). The analysis revealed a significant two-way interaction
[F(1, 94) 5 5.33, p , .03]. This interaction indicates that the relationship
between the amount of information and judgment revision following the chal-
lenge depended on the type of challenge. The effect occurred in spite of the
initial evaluation being higher in the nine-claims condition than in the three-
claims condition [5.64 vs 5.14, F(1, .94) 5 3.36, p , .07]. Follow-up analyses
revealed that the simple effect of amount of information was significant under
noncomparativechallenge[F(1,94)55.71,p,.03],indicatingthat(downward)
judgment revisions were lower in the high-information condition (M 5 0.85)
than in the low-information condition (M 5 1.91). This simple effect replicates
previous results in the literature (e.g., Haugtvedt et al., 1994; Wood, 1982).
However, the simple effect of the amount of information was not significant
under comparative challenge [F(1, 94) 5 1.19, p . .27]. Consistent with our
predictions, the amount of prior information did not appear to decrease subse-
quent judgment revision when the challenge was comparative. This effect oc-
curs because the high opportunity for comparison provided by the challenge
decreases the relative weight placed on prior information. A mediation analysis
was conducted to document this interpretation.
Mediation analysis. If comparative challenges decrease the relative weight
of previous information in judgment revision, the amount of prior target infor-
mation that participants can recall at the time of the challenge should be a
betterpredictorofjudgmentrevisioninthenoncomparativechallengecondition
than in the comparative challenge condition. The mediation role of recall of
target information was assessed as suggested by Baron and Kenny (1986).
Within each challenge condition, judgment revisions were submitted to a one-
way ANCOVA with claim recall as an additional predictor. In the noncompara-
tive challenge condition, claim recall had a significant effect on (lack of) judg-
ment revision [F(1, 93) 5 6.20, p , .01]. Moreover, inclusion of claim recall in
the model renders the effect of amount of information nonsignificant (F , 1).
Thus, in the noncomparative challenge condition, recall of previous target
information mediated the effects of amount of information on lack of judgment
revision. In contrast, in the comparative challenge condition, claim recall did238 MUTHUKRISHNAN, PHAM, AND MUNGALE ￿
not have any influence on judgment revision (F , 1). Therefore, we conclude
that in this condition, prior target information did not have much weight on
the degree of judgment revision.
Discussion
The results of Experiment 1 extend previous research by showing that the
relationshipbetweentheamountofpriorinformationandsubsequentjudgment
revision depends on the opportunity for comparison induced by the challenge.
We found that when the challenge did not foster comparisons, the amount of
targetinformationthatparticipantshadlearnedindeeddecreasedtheprobabil-
ity and degree of judgment revision. This finding replicates previous results
(e.g.,Haugvedtetal.,1994;Wood,1982).However,whenthechallengeexplicitly
promoted comparisons between the target and a competitor, the amount of
target information that participants had learned did not affect the degree of
judgment revision. This is noteworthy considering that not only did the chal-
lengepertainto attributesthatwerelessimportantthan thepreviouslylearned
target information, but also, inthe high-initial-information condition, less chal-
lenge information than initial information was presented. Participants in the
noncomparative condition were apparently more inclined to rely on the pre-
viously learned target information, whereas participants exposed to the com-
parative challenge were less inclined to do so. The mediation analysis of claim
recall supports this interpretation.
The differential inclination to rely on prior information cannot be attributed
to a change in the scale value of the challenge. The results from a pretest and
from a confounding check show that the comparative version of the challenge
was not more negative than the noncomparative version of the challenge.
Instead, the differential inclination to rely on prior information appears to
reflect the greater “evaluability” of the challenging information when it was
framed in a comparative format (Hsee, 1996). We offer that the greater evalua-
bilityofthecomparativechallengeledparticipantstoassignarelativelygreater
weight to the challenging information. This interpretation is explicitly tested
in Experiment 2.
EXPERIMENT 2
This experiment tests the prediction that comparative challenges are
weighted more strongly in judgment revision than are noncomparative chal-
lenges. As in Experiment 1, participants who had formed a favorable prior
evaluation of the target were exposed to either a comparative challenge or a
noncomparative challenge. Unlike in Experiment 1, it is the number of pieces
of information contained in the challenge that varied across conditions. If
challenging information receives a greater weight when presented in a compar-
ative format than when presented in a noncomparative format, the number of
pieces ofinformation containedin thechallenge shouldhave a greaterinfluence
on judgment revision in the former case than in the latter.COMPARISON AND JUDGMENT REVISION 239
Method
A total of 114 participants were assigned to one of four conditions of a 2 3
2 between-subjects design. The first factor manipulated the type of challenge
(noncomparative vs comparative), while the second factor manipulated the
number of pieces of information contained in the challenge (2 vs 5). In the first
session, all participants were exposed to nine claims about the target (as in
the high information condition of Experiment 1) and expressed their initial
judgments. Two days later, participants were exposed to either a noncompara-
tive challenge or a comparative challenge, as in Experiment 1. Within each
type of challenge, the number of pieces of information was varied. Participants
in the “weak challenge” condition received two pieces of challenging informa-
tion, whereas participants in the “strong challenge” condition received five
pieces of challenging information. The remainder of the procedure was the
same as in Experiment 1.
Results and Discussion
The first dependent measure was the proportion of participants who revised
their judgment at least by 1 scale unit (see Table 2). It was submitted to a two-
way binary logit analysis with type and strength of the challenge as predictors.
Although the interaction was not significant (Wald x2(1) 5 1.83, p . .17), the
simple effects of challenge strength within each type of challenge were in
the predicted direction. Specifically, in the comparative challenge condition
challenge strength had a marginally significant influence on likelihood of revi-
sionby 1unit ormore (Waldx2(1)53.77,p,.06).However, inthe noncompara-
tive challenge condition, challenge strength did not significantly influence the
likelihood of revision by 1 unit or more (Wald x2(1) 5 0.17, p 5 .68).
The analysis pertaining to the dependent variable of magnitude of judgment
revision revealed a marginally significant type of challenge 3 strength of chal-
lenge interaction [F(1, 101) 5 3.69, p , .06; see Table 2 for the means]. Follow-
up tests show that when the challenging information was in a noncomparative
format, the number of pieces of information contained in the challenge did not
significantly influence the degree of judgment revision [F(1, 101) 5 1.65, p .
TABLE 2
Experiment 2 (Pen): Effects of Amount of Challenging Information and
Format of Challenge
Comparative format Noncomparative format
Dependent measure Low info High info Low info High info
Initial judgment 6.95 6.96 6.66 6.83
Postchallenge judgment 5.20 3.91 5.46 5.21
Judgment revision 1.75 3.05 1.20 1.62
Proportion of judgment revision 67% 89% 67% 70%
by 1 unit or more (18/27) (25/28) (17/26) (17/24)240 MUTHUKRISHNAN, PHAM, AND MUNGALE ￿
.30]. Mean judgment revision was 1.21 and 1.63 for the weak and strong
challenges,respectively.However,whenthechallengewasphrasedinacompar-
ative format, the number of pieces of information contained in the challenge
had a strong effect on judgment revision [F(1, 101) 5 17.05, p , .001]. The
stronger challenge (with a higher number of pieces of information) produced
greater judgment revision (M53.05) than did the weaker challenge (M51.75).
Overall, there was evidence that the negative information contained in the
challenge was weighted more strongly in the revised evaluations when the
challenge explicitly invited comparisons (comparative format) than when it did
not (noncomparative format). Together with the results of Experiment 1, these
results indicate that challenges framed in a comparative format decrease the
weight attached to prior target information and increase the weight attached
to information conveyed by the challenge itself. This is consistent with the
comparison–revision hypothesis that, when there is high opportunity for com-
parisons, the evaluative implications of these comparisons carry a dispropor-
tionate weight in judgment revisions.
EXPERIMENT 3
The first two experiments examined judgment revision in the consumer-
decision domain. One could argue that the effects of comparison opportunity
are particular to consumer settings, where comparative advertisements are
pervasive. The purpose of this experiment was to examine the role of compari-
son opportunity and amount of information in another domain, that of person-
nel selections. The results were expected to replicate (and generalize) those of
Experiment 1: The amount of information would reduce subsequent revision
under a noncomparative challenge but not under a comparative challenge.
Method
Participants in this experiment were asked to evaluate a candidate for a
management consultant position based on some initial attribute information
(see Appendix B). They subsequently received additional, negative information
about the target (the challenge), and their evaluations of the target were then
reassessed. The experiment was conducted during a classroom lecture with
the same design as in Experiment 1. Eighty-five participants were assigned
to one of four conditions of a 2 3 2 design. The first factor manipulated the
amount of initial information (high or low) participants received for the prior
evaluation at the beginning of the lecture. The second factor manipulated the
format of the challenging information (comparative or noncomparative) that
participants received at the end of the lecture (90 min later). As in Experiment
1, the challenge pertained to three attributes that were somewhat less im-
portant than the prior information. Results from a pretest (n 5 22) indicated
that the average importance of the prior information attributes was 7.01 on
an 11-point scale, whereas the average importance of the challenge attributes
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claims referred only to the candidate (e.g., “[Mr. X] was 10 minutes late for
his job interview”). In the comparative condition, the same claims were made
in comparison with another candidate (“[Mr. X] was 10 minutes late for his
job interview, while Mr. Y was on time”). As in Experiment 1, another pretest
(n 5 24) ensured that the challenging information was perceived to be equally
negative in the two conditions (Mnoncomparative 5 2.16, Mcomparative 5 2.02;
F , 1). Prior and postchallenge evaluations were both measured on two 9-point
scalesanchoredbyveryunfavorable–veryfavorableandbad–good.Participants
were also asked to recall the initial information after they had reported their
postchallenge evaluations.
Results
As predicted, the results closely replicated those of Experiment 1. A two-
way (amount of information 3 type of challenge) categorical analysis of the
proportion of participants who revised their judgment at least by 1 scale unit
revealed a significant amount-of-information 3 type-of-challenge interaction
(Waldx2(1)55.29,p,.03).Asexpected,amountofpriorinformationdecreased
the likelihood of subsequent revision under a noncomparative challenge (Wald
x2(1) 5 4.64, p , .03), but not under a comparative challenge (Wald x2(1) 5
1.28, p . .25). A two-way ANOVA of the amount of judgment revision revealed
a similar interaction [F(1, 81) 5 3.95, p , .05; see Table 3 for the means].
Under a noncomparative challenge, judgment revision was greater in the low-
information condition than in the high-information condition [F(1, 81) 5 5.33,
p , .05]. However, under a comparative challenge, the two information condi-
tions did not differ in terms of judgment revision (F , 1).
Additional results indicate that the effect of amount of information in the
noncomparative challenge condition was mediated by recall of the initial infor-
mation. Recall was higher in the high-information condition (M 5 2.35) than
in the low-information condition (M 5 1.05), F(1, 81) 5 10.7, p , .01. When
recall was included as a covariate in an ANCOVA of judgment revision in the
TABLE 3
Experiment 3 (Employee Selection): Effects of Amount of Target Information and
Format of Challenge
Noncomparative Comparative
challenge challenge Control
Dependent measure Low info High info Low info High info Low info High info
Initial judgment 7.34 7.50 7.38 7.18 6.99 7.23
Confidence at Time 1 6.22 6.70 6.20 6.56 ** **
Postchallenge 4.23 5.67 4.93 4.72 6.78 7.11
Judgment revision 3.11 1.83 2.45 2.44 0.21 0.12
Proportion whose judgment 95% 65% 85% 95% 20% 7%
revision is 1 unit or more (21/22) (13/20) (17/20) (22/23) (3/15) (1/15)
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noncomparative challenge condition, the simple effect of amount of information
on judgment revision was reduced to nonsignificance (F , 1), whereas the
effect of recall was significant [F(1, 80) 5 16.7, p , .01].
Discussion
These results replicate those of Experiment 1 and suggest that the effects
of comparative versus noncomparative challenges on judgment revision are
robust across decision domains. Taken together, the results of the first three
experiments indicate that comparative challenges, which explicitly invite com-
parisons of the target with a competitor, (1) decrease the weight attached to
prior information and (2) increase the weight attached to the comparisons
conveyed by the challenge. These effects occur even when the challenging
information pertains to attributes that are less important than those contained
in the prior information. Our results convey that because opportunity for com-
parison plays an important role in judgment revision, amount of prior informa-
tion does not always reduce judgment revision. Experiment 4 examines the
role of opportunity for comparison in judgment revision when comparisons are
only implicitly invited.
EXPERIMENT 4
Recall that the comparative revision hypothesis postulates two necessary
conditions—jointaccessofthetargetandcompetitiveinformationandcommen-
surability—for comparison opportunity. In Experiments 1–3, at the time of
revised judgments, information about the target as well as the competitor was
available externally and in a commensurable format. Thus, the two conditions
were met. In the real world, there are many instances in which competitive
information is presented in a noncomparative manner. Further, opportunity
for a side-by-side comparison may not be so readily available. In Experiment
4, we considered an instance of memory-based comparison and directly varied
the two antecedents of comparison opportunity. The first condition, joint access
of the target and competitor information was varied via an elaboration likeli-
hood manipulation at the time the participants received initial information
about the target. Conditions that enhance elaboration of the target information
would also enhance subsequent memory for the target’s specific attribute val-
ues, thus allowing a joint access to target and competitor information during
judgment revision.
The second condition is that the target’s and the competitor’s attributes
are commensurable. We achieved the commensurability manipulation via the
formatofthecompetitorinformationcontainedinthechallenge.Thus,compari-
son opportunity would be higher in the condition that facilitates enhanced
memoryforthetargetinformationandalsopresentsthecompetitorinformation
in exactly the same format as that of the target information. Therefore, based
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(downward) willbe greaterin the conditionthat combineshigh commensurabil-
ity with greater elaboration of the initial information than in any other condi-
tion. Thus, under high commensurability, greater elaboration leads to a lesser
rather than greater degree of resistance (cf. Haugtvedt & Wegener, 1994; Petty,
Haugtvedt, & Smith, 1995).
Method
Participants and design. Two hundred thirty-one participants were ran-
domly assigned to one of four conditions of a 2 (commensurability) 3 2 (elabora-
tion) between-subjects design. Data from 15 participants who did not complete
all the experimental tasks were excluded. In addition, 106 participants were
assigned to two control conditions, which varied in terms of levels of initial
elaboration, but did not involve a challenge. These control conditions allowed
us to assess sheer evaluative persistence across levels of elaboration.
Procedure. The experiment was conducted in two parts separated by 90
min of a regular class lecture. The experiment was introduced as a study on
consumers’ evaluation of cameras. This product category was selected for two
reasons. First, the elaboration manipulation required a certain level of product
complexity. Second, the commensurability manipulation required a product
that could be described by numerical attributes. In the first part, participants
saw an advertisement for the target, Camera X, under conditions of either
high or low elaboration. Participants then reported their initial evaluation of
the target on three 9-point scales anchored by agree (that it is good)–disagree
(that it is good), dislike–like, and unfavorable–favorable. They also reported
their confidence in their initial evaluation on the same scale as in the previ-
ous experiments.
Ninety minutes later, as a challenge to the target, participants saw an adver-
tisement for a competitor brand, Camera Y. The Camera Y ad provided noncom-
parative information that was either commensurable or noncommensurable
with the Target X’s information. After seeing the competitor’s ad, participants
reported their postchallenge evaluation of the target (using the same scales
as for the initial evaluation), their confidence in the postchallenge evaluation,
the perceived difficulty of comparing the two brands (1 5 easy to compare and
7 5 difficult to compare), the amount of attention paid to the target information
during initial evaluation (1 5 lot of attention and 7 5 little attention), and
their perceived knowledge of cameras (1 5 not at all knowledgeable and 9 5
highly knowledgeable). Participants in the control groups rated Camera X at
Time 2 without seeing the Camera Y advertisement.
Elaboration. Degree of elaboration was manipulated by varying both the
personal relevance of the target information and the opportunity to process this
information (see Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). In the high-elaboration condition,
participants were led to believe that the camera would soon be available at an
on-campus trade show and were given 4 min to process the instructions and
the ad content. In the low-elaboration condition, participants were told that244 MUTHUKRISHNAN, PHAM, AND MUNGALE ￿
the product would be available next year in a distant city and were given only
1 min to process the instructions and the ad content.
The effectiveness of this manipulation was assessed across three measures:
(1) self-reported attention, (2) number of thoughts listed, and (3) memory. Self-
reported attention was assessed in the main study and is discussed later. One
pretest (n 5 28) assessed the number of thoughts generated across levels of
the elaboration manipulation. Participants first watched the ad for Camera
X under either the high- or the low-elaboration condition. One hour later,
participants were given 2 min to list all the thoughts that came to their minds.
As expected, the number of camera-relevant thoughts was higher in the high-
elaboration condition (M 5 3.07) than in the low-elaboration condition (M 5
2.29; F 5 9.53, p , .01).
Another pretest (n 5 49) tested the assumption that the elaboration manipu-
lation would influence memory for the specific values of the target brand’s
attributes. The procedure closely paralleled that of the main experiment. In
the first part of the pretest, participants were exposed to the target ad under
either high or low elaboration. In the second part, participants were exposed
toan adfor thecompetitor branddescribedin acommensurable format.Instead
of reporting their postchallenge evaluation of the target, participants were
asked to recall the values of the numerical attributes of the target brand.
The attribute dimensions (e.g., “weight” and “focus length”) were provided
as retrieval cues. The recall for each attribute was classified as accurate or
inaccurate by a judge who was blind to the experimental conditions. As ex-
pected,anANOVArevealedthatthetotalnumberofattributevaluesaccurately
recalled was significantly higher in the high-elaboration condition (M 5 2.17)
than in the low-elaboration condition [M 5 1.12; F(1, 47) 5 12.62, p , .01].
Commensurability. The target ad shown in the first part of the main study
stated Camera X’s country of origin as well as numerical information about
the camera’s weight (320 g), focus length range (35–60 m), shutter speed
(1/3000), and exposure accuracy (experts’ rating of 3 of 5). Commensurability
was manipulated by varying the format in which the competitor ad information
was provided. In the high-commensurability condition, Camera Y’s attributes
were described in the same format as Camera X’s. The two brands shared the
same country of origin. However, Camera Y’s numerical attributes (e.g.,
“weight: 280 grams”) were clearly superior to those of Camera X. In the low-
commensurabilitycondition,CameraY’sattributesweredescribedusingverbal
labels (e.g., “weight: somewhat light”). The verbal labels used in the noncom-
mensurable condition were calibrated via a pretest (n 5 40) so that they would
correspond to the numerical values used in the commensurable condition (see
Appendix C). Another between-subjects pretest (n 5 60) showed that partici-
pants exposed to the verbal (noncommensurable) description of the competitor
camera reported similar evaluation of this camera (M 5 6.2) as did participants
exposedtothenumerical(commensurable)descriptionofthecompetitorcamera
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acrosslevelsofcommensurabilitywhenthisinformationwasevaluatedwithout
a reference to the target.
Results: Manipulation and Confounding Checks
Commensurability. As expected, in the main study, participants in the low-
commensurability condition perceived the comparison between the two brands
to be more difficult than did participants in the high-commensurability condi-
tion [Mlow 5 4.62, Mhigh 5 3.44, F(1, 214) 5 8.3, p , .01].
Elaboration. Consistent with the pretest results, in the main study, the
elaboration manipulation resulted in greater self-reported attention in the
high-elaboration condition (M 5 2.60) than in the low-elaboration condition
[M 5 3.09, F(1, 212) 5 5.43, p , .02). Self-reported knowledge of the product
category did not vary across elaboration conditions (F , 1), and therefore was
not a potential confound.
Likelihood of revision. Table 4 reports the proportion of participants who
revised their judgments in each condition. A commensurability 3 elaboration
logit analysis of this measure revealed a main effect of commensurability (Wald
x2(1) 5 15.59, p , .01). As expected, the probability of revision was greater
when the competitor challenge was highly commensurable (63%) than when
it was not commensurable (35%). There was also a main effect of elaboration
(Wald x2(1) 5 15.59, p , .05), showing that judgment revision was more likely
under high elaboration (62%) than under low elaboration (35%). More im-
portant, these main effects were qualified by a commensurability 3 elaboration
interaction (Wald x2(1) 5 2.58, p , .10). The effect of high commensurability
was much stronger under high initial elaboration (Wald x2(1) 5 14.96,
p , .01) than under low initial elaboration (Wald x2(1) 5 2.88, p , .10).
Contrasts with the control conditions (within each level of elaboration) show
that, in the high elaboration–high commensurability condition, the probability
of judgment revision increased significantly over that accountable by the effect
of time (Wald x2(1) 5 25.03, p , .01). None of the other experimental conditions
TABLE 4
Experiment 4 (Camera): Effects of Initial Elaboration and Commensurability
Low-elaboration High-elaboration
Commensurability Commensurability
Dependent measure Low High Control Low High Control
Initial judgment 5.37 5.24 5.53 5.2 5.23 5.67
Confidence at Time 1 4.03 4.79 4.85 4.95 5.05 5.28
Postchallenge judgment 5.35 4.64 5.18 5.52 4.06 5.56
Judgment revision 0.02 0.60 0.35 20.24 1.17 0.11
Proportion whose judgment 33% 49% 48% 36% 74% 22%
revision is more than 0 (17/52) (26/53) (25/52) (22/61) (37/50) (12/54)246 MUTHUKRISHNAN, PHAM, AND MUNGALE ￿
exhibited significantly greater revision than in the corresponding control condi-
tion.3
Judgment revisions. The magnitudes of judgment revisions (see Table 4)
were submitted to a similar commensurability 3 elaboration ANOVA. The
analysis revealed the expected main effect of commensurability [F(1, 212) 5
29.52, p , .01], showing that judgment revisions were more pronounced in the
high-commensurability condition (M 5 0.88) than in the low commensurability
condition(M520.12). However,this effectwasagain qualifiedby acommensu-
rability 3 elaboration interaction [F(1, 212) 5 5.07, p , .03]. The simple effect
of commensurability was much stronger in the high-elaboration condition [F(1,
212) 5 30.3, p , .001] than in the low-elaboration condition [F(1, 212) 5
4.06, p , .05]. Contrasts with the control conditions (within each elaboration
condition) show that judgment revisions were greater than those accountable
by the effect of time only in the high elaboration–high commensurability group
[F(1, 316) 5 20.83, p , .01].
Discussion
This experiment provides further evidence that the magnitude of judgment
revision on encountering a challenge depends on whether the challenge facili-
tates comparisons between the target and its competitors. We found that judg-
ment revisions were most likely and most pronounced in the condition where
there was both high initial elaboration of the target information and high
commensurability between the target’s attributes and those of the competitors.
This effect occurred because this condition combined the two necessary and
jointly sufficient determinants of comparison opportunity—joint access to tar-
get the competing sets of information and high commensurability. Specifically,
high initial elaboration of the target information increases the subsequent
accessibilityofthetarget’sspecificattributevalues,whereashighcommensura-
bility facilitates attribute-by-attribute comparisons between the accessible tar-
get information and competitor information.
The results also offer commensurability as a moderator of the relationship
between elaboration of prior information and resistance. Previous research had
suggested that high initial elaboration should strengthen the initial evaluation
and therefore decrease subsequent revision (Haugtvedt & Wegener, 1994; Petty
et al., 1995). Greater elaboration indeed enhanced the strength of prior evalua-
tions in terms of confidence in and persistence of prior evaluation when there
was no challenge. However, when there was a challenge from a superior and
commensurable competitor, high elaboration increased the likelihood and mag-
nitude of subsequent revision. The relationship between initial elaboration
3 Contrasts with the corresponding control conditions (within each level of elaboration) were
necessary in this experiment because, unlike in the other experiments, the two control conditions
differed significantly in terms of probability of subsequent revision (Wald x2(1) 5 11.39, p , .001).
Consistent with prior theories on attitude strength, in the absence of a challenge, the likelihood
of revision was lower under high elaboration (22%) than under low elaboration (44%).COMPARISON AND JUDGMENT REVISION 247
and subsequent revision may thus depend on both the nature of the initial
information and the type of challenge.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Becausepeopleencounterinformationthatchallengestheirpriorevaluations
almost every day, the determinants of judgment revision need to be better
understood. It is obvious that judgment revision will depend on the relative
scale value of the challenging information. Various streams of research suggest
thatjudgmentrevisionmayalsobeinverselyrelatedtotheamountandelabora-
tion of the information that supports the prior evaluation. The present research
investigatedtheroleofahithertounexaminedfactor—opportunityforcompari-
son produced by the challenge—in judgment revisions. Consistent with the
comparison–revision hypothesis, the results from four experiments indicate
that whenever challenges facilitate comparisons between the target and its
competitors, these comparisons generally carry a disproportionate weight in
the revised judgments. Strong opportunities for comparison may attenuate
and,attimes,reversethepreviouslydocumentednegativerelationshipbetween
amount and elaboration of prior information and judgment revision.
The moderating role of comparison opportunity was observed with two dis-
tinct operationalizations of this construct. In Experiments 1, 2, and 3 opportu-
nity for comparison was driven by the comparative vs noncomparative framing
of the challenge. It was found that challenges framed in a comparative format
were weighted more strongly in judgment revisions than were equally negative
challenges framed in a noncomparative format.
These effects are consistent with the evaluability hypothesis (Hsee, 1996;
Hsee, Loewenstein, Blount, & Bazerman, 1999), which was originally proposed
as an explanation of preference reversals between joint evaluations of alterna-
tives and separate evaluations of the same alternatives. The hypothesis holds
that such reversals occur because a joint evaluation enhances the “evaluability”
of otherwise ambiguous attributes. In our Experiments 1 to 3, the noncompara-
tive challenging information, which focused on target attributes of lesser impor-
tance, may have been hard to assess by itself. However, when presented in a
comparative format, the same information may have been disambiguated by
the mention of a superior competitor reference, thereby inducing a greater
degree of judgment revision.
Apart from suggesting that commensurability moderates the elaboration–
judgment revision relationship, Experiment 4’s results also extend the research
that shows that alignable differences between alternatives receive greater
weightinjudgmentandchoice(e.g.,Markman&Medin,1995).Previousstudies
of this phenomenon focused on situations in which the information about the
alternativeswasexternallyprovided(e.g.,Slovic&MacPhillamy,1974).Experi-
ment 4 suggests that this effect may also extend to situations in which informa-
tion about one of the alternatives is available only from memory.
The moderating role of comparison opportunity appears to be a general one.
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it across different judgment domains: evaluation of a pen, evaluation of an
employee, and evaluation of a camera. However, our studies examined only
instances were favorable initial evaluations were subsequently challenged by
negative information. A worthwhile extension of this research would be to
examine instances in which negative prior evaluations are subsequently chal-
lenged by favorable information.
Another interesting issue to investigate in future research is whether people
update their prior attitudes or construct new attitudes when the challenge is
framed in such a manner as to offer a high opportunity for comparison. Given
the recent view that often evaluations are constructed rather than stable enti-
ties (Wilson & Hodges, 1992), it is worth studying whether comparison opportu-
nity serves as an antecedent of such construction. In our future research that
will investigate the constructional nature of revised judgments, we intend to
obtainadditionalprocessmeasuressuchasresponsetimesandverbalprotocols.
APPENDIX A
Attributes Used in Experiment 1 (Importance Ratings on an 11-Point Scale
Anchored by “Not at All Important” and “Extremely Important”)
Initial Information in the Nine-Claims Condition
Special erasing features that eliminates smudges (8.66)
The benzine tip that facilitates smooth, no-skip writing (9.38)
The smearproof, quick-drying ink that improves writing performance (8.49)*
A special feature that helps a comfortable grip (8.34)
Sloped design and optimal balancing (8.61)*
The special pressurized cartridge that allows for writing at any angle (9.0)
Omega 3’s availability at most stores (8.72)
New ink polymer in the Omega 3 for long use (9.21)*
Offering good writing performance on most surfaces (9.08)
* Claims that were also used in the low-information (three-claims) condition.
Challenge Claims
Performance on nonporous surfaces such as glass and ceramics (7.92)
Availability of refills (7.47)
Ease (or difficulty) of opening the packages in which the pens were shipped
(7.90)
APPENDIX B
Attributes Used in Experiment 3 and Their Importance
Ratings on an 11-Point Scale
Initial Information in the High-Information Condition
Has 8 years of prior experience in management consulting (7.8)*COMPARISON AND JUDGMENT REVISION 249
Has an MBA degree from one of the top 20 business schools in the United
States (7.1)*
Has worked in four different Asian countries in addition to the United
States (6.6)*
Has good presentation skills (7.4)
Keeps up to date with the business news by reading several business news-
papers and magazines (6.9)
Has been promoted recently in his current place of work (6.3)
* Subset used in the low-information condition.
Challenge Attributes
Not very good with office software such as PowerPoint, Word, and Excel (5.9)
Is not well organized (6.4)
Was 10 min late for the job interview (5.7)
APPENDIX C
Pretest for the Choice of Verbal Labels Corresponding to the
Numerical Descriptions
The verbal labels for the specific numeric attributes of cameras were initially
selected on the basis of product literature and consultations with a small group
of experts (n 5 5) in the field. These labels were then validated in a pretest
among 80 participants belonging to the same population as participants in the
main study. In the pretest, participants were provided with the numerical
values of either the target camera (n 5 40) or the competitor (n 5 40) and
were asked to indicate which of the five categories will accurately describe the
camera. For example, participants were asked which of the following labels
would be most appropriate for a camera that weighs 320 g: Light, Somewhat
Light, Medium Weight, Somewhat Heavy, and Heavy. Response frequencies
(proportions) are given below.
Initial information (n 5 40)
Weight(320 g):Light[7 (17.5%)];Somewhat Light[25(62.5%)]; MediumWeight
[6 (15%)]; Somewhat Heavy [2 (3%)]; Heavy [0].
Focus length range (35–60 m): High [4 (10%)]; Somewhat High [31 (77.5%);
Medium [3 (7.5%)]; Somewhat Low [1 (2.5%)]; Low [1 (2.5%)]
Shutter speed (1/3000 of a second): High [8 (20%); Somewhat High [24 (60%)];
Medium [4 (10%); Somewhat Low [3 (7.5%); Low [1 (2.5%)]
Exposure accuracy [3 on a 5-point scale (rated by experts)]: Accurate [0]; Some-
what Accurate [5 (12.5%); Medium [34 (85%)]; Somewhat Inaccurate [1
(2.5%)]; Inaccurate [0]250 MUTHUKRISHNAN, PHAM, AND MUNGALE ￿
Challenge Information (n 5 40)
Weight (280 g): Light [28 (70%)]; Somewhat Light [6 (15%)]; Medium Weight
[4 (10%)]; Somewhat Heavy [2 (3%)]; Heavy [0].
Focus length range (35–120 m): High [32 (80%)]; Somewhat High [7 (17.5);
Medium [1 (2.5%)]; Somewhat Low [0]; Low [0]
Shutter speed (1/8000 of a second): High [35 (87.5%); Somewhat High [4 (10%)];
Medium [1 (2.5%); Somewhat Low [3 (7.5%); Low [1 (2.5%)]
Exposure accuracy [4 on a 5-point scale (rated by experts)]: Accurate [2 (5%)];
Somewhat Accurate [33 (82.5%)]; Medium [5 (12.5%)]; Somewhat Inaccurate
[0]; Inaccurate [0]
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